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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to advance the understanding of the conditions that give rise to flash crash
contagion, particularly with respect to overlapping asset portfolio crowding. To this end, we designed, im-
plemented, and assessed a hybrid micro-macro agent-based model, where price impact arises endogenously
through the limit order placement activity of algorithmic traders. Our novel hybrid microscopic and macro-
scopic model allows us to quantify systemic risk not just in terms of system stability, but also in terms of the
speed of financial distress propagation over intraday timescales. We find that systemic risk is strongly depen-
dent on the behaviour of algorithmic traders, on leverage management practices, and on network topology.
Our results demonstrate that, for high-crowding regimes, contagion speed is a non-monotone function of
portfolio diversification. We also find the surprising result that, in certain circumstances, increased portfolio
crowding is beneficial to systemic stability. We are not aware of previous studies that have exhibited this
phenomenon, and our results establish the importance of considering non-uniform asset allocations in future
studies. Finally, we characterise the time window available for regulatory interventions during the propa-
gation of flash crash distress, with results suggesting ex ante precautions may have higher efficacy than ex
post reactions.
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1. Introduction
During the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010, over a trillion dollars were wiped off the value of US companies
in an event that has been largely attributed to the rise of algorithmic trading (Kirilenko et al., 2017).
Although the circumstances giving rise to the Flash Crash have been intensely studied since 2010, the
role played by algorithmic traders in propagating systemic risk through financial networks remains poorly
understood. In the context of networks representing the overlap of asset portfolios held by investment
funds (hereafter funds), systemic risk arises as a result of price impact (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: james.paulin@cs.ox.ac.uk (James Paulin), ani.calinescu@cs.ox.ac.uk (Anisoara Calinescu),
mjw@cs.ox.ac.uk (Michael Wooldridge)
Preprint submitted to J. 23rd May 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
08
45
4v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.T
R]
  2
2 M
ay
 20
18
Despite this, over-simplified systemic risk models typically assume non-crisis linear price impact functions
(Benoit et al., 2017). Systemic events such as the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010 demonstrate that during
crises (conditions of abnormal perturbation when system dynamics are far from equilibrium), price impact
can deviate strongly from linearity (Kirilenko et al., 2017). Analyses of flash crashes have found that the
market’s ability to facilitate price discovery is strongly dependent on the micro-level behaviour of market
participants, in particular those involved in algorithmic trading (CFTC and SEC, 2010; Menkveld, 2016).
In the present work, we simulate crisis price impact due to algorithmic trading with a limit order book
(LOB) agent-based model (ABM), calibrated to exhibit extreme transient price impact phenomena such as
flash crashes. The micro-model is derived from Paddrik et al. (2012). We combine this micro-level ABM with
a macro-level network model of overlapping leveraged asset portfolios held by funds. Our paper presents a
novel synthesis of models from both the microstructure and the macroeconomic literatures. We are aware
of few related studies that attempt such a synthesis (Gerig, 2015; Torii et al., 2015). We investigate a key
interface between the two classes of model by addressing the over-simplified price impact assumptions typical
of macroscopic systemic risk models. In reality, asset prices are formed due to the action of individual traders
placing limit orders on stock exchanges, and this is true whether the trader is a global bank seeking to reduce
position sizes over several days, or a high-frequency trader (HFT, Menkveld, 2016) targeting fleeting profit
opportunities lasting fractions of a second. However, assets do not exist in isolation. Rather, they are held
within the portfolios of funds. Funds are thus connected to each other by virtue of the assets they hold
in common. Similarly, assets are connected to each other by virtue of being held in the same portfolio at
a fund (Allen and Babus, 2008). Following established methodology from the macroscopic systemic risk
literature (Huang et al., 2013; Caccioli et al., 2014; Cont and Schaanning, 2017), we represent the fund-asset
network as a bipartite graph. We extend previous works by controlling network topology with a preferential
attachment method (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999) which allows us to tune the degree of portfolio overlap and
hence the connectivity between funds.
When funds borrow from a bank or brokerage to finance an asset portfolio, they are required to maintain
leverage (the ratio of portfolio value to collateral) below a pre-agreed limit as the value of the assets in their
portfolio varies (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). If the portfolio value suffers a loss due to price fluctu-
ation, the fund may be required to either deposit additional capital or rapidly liquidate assets (deleverage)
in order to satisfy the leverage constraint. This scenario is known as a margin call and can be enacted by
the lending bank on a daily or intraday (during trading hours) basis (Gai et al., 2011; Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009). Loss to the lender bank accrues when the liquidation value of a client fund’s portfolio is
less than the value of the outstanding loans for which the portfolio acts as collateral. In this circumstance,
it is impossible for the fund to repay its debt, and the fund defaults. As Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
describe, a problematic amplification mechanism known as a margin spiral can occur if a fund is forced
to sell its assets due to losses: the action of selling further depresses prices, increasing losses and requires
further rounds of distressed selling. Systemic risk arises when different funds have investments in the same
assets. Here, distressed selling by a fund causing prices to fall via price impact will cause losses at all other
funds with investments in the distressed assets. These other funds may then be required to reduce the size
of their investments in order to manage their leverage and so the distress propagates in what is known as a
fire sale (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011).
Our hybrid micro-macro ABM allows us to characterise the effect on systemic risk of leverage management
policies and fund-asset network topology. In addition to considering systemic stability (characterised by the
default of funds on their margin loans), the use of a limit order book ABM allows us to measure the speed
at which financial distress propagates between assets over short intraday timescales characteristic of flash
crashes. We investigate systemic risk due to (i) portfolio crowding, which is a measure of the similarity
of the asset portfolios held by different funds, and due to (ii) portfolio diversification which relates to the
number of assets in which funds invest. We further investigate the effects on systemic risk of the amount of
leverage and capital deployed by funds, and of the tolerance with which funds manage their leverage under
fluctuating asset price conditions. We show how these parameters control liquidity supply due to distressed
selling in the limit order book. We also identify conditions under which leverage management practices
constitute a sufficient contagion channel for flash crash propagation and default cascades.
Our results contribute to the growing literature on the use of ABMs to investigate the complex, emergent
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dynamics of financial systems (LeBaron, 2000; Tesfatsion, 2002; Farmer and Foley, 2009; Haldane and May,
2011; Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017; Haldane and Turrell, 2018). ABMs are able to reproduce empirically
observed features (stylised facts, Cont, 2001) of financial systems that cannot easily be captured within
mainstream Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) approaches (Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017).
The complex interactions of heterogeneous, boundedly-rational, autonomous agents give rise to emergent
phenomena that cannot be predicted from an understanding of agent behaviour alone. However, this expres-
siveness comes at a cost. ABMs typically feature a large number of parameters, making model calibration
difficult and costly in terms of computational resources. It is, furthermore, necessary to perform repeated
stochastic Monte Carlo simulations of ABMs in order to build statistical confidence in observed system
dynamics (Franke and Westerhoff, 2012). However, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 demonstrated the in-
adequacy of mainstream DSGE models in analysing the systemic risk of the banking system (Fagiolo and
Roventini, 2017). ABMs offer a compelling alternative, and advances in their methodology and in computer
power and data availability will further enhance their effectiveness.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related studies. Section 3 presents our joint mi-
croscopic/macroscopic simulation methodology. Section 4 presents an empirical validation of the model.
Section 5 presents results demonstrating the effect of distressed selling on asset prices. Results concerning
the impact of leverage, capitalisation and margin tolerance on systemic risk are provided in Section 6. The
effect of fund–asset network topology on systemic risk is investigated in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the
paper and presents further work directions.
2. Related Work
There has been growing recognition of the importance of considering network effects as contributing
factors to systemic risk in the financial industry e.g., Gai and Kapadia (2010); Gai et al. (2011); Haldane
and May (2011); Acemoglu et al. (2015); Haldane and Turrell (2018). Within this literature, distressed
deleveraging (fire sales, Shleifer and Vishny, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2015), has been established as a major
channel for financial distress contagion via shared asset holdings (Arinaminpathy et al., 2012; Caccioli et al.,
2014, 2015; Battiston et al., 2016; Capponi and Larsson, 2015; Cont and Schaanning, 2017). When funds
hold overlapping portfolios of shared assets this is known as crowding (Menkveld, 2015; Sias et al., 2016).
Price impact (To´th et al., 2011; Zarinelli et al., 2015) is critical to understanding the role of position
crowding in fire-sale distress. Price impact under distressed market conditions has been shown to exhibit
very different properties to price impact under equilibrium conditions (Cristelli et al., 2010). However, as
Table 1 illustrates, this aspect of shared-asset models is often treated in a simplified manner. This point is
also raised by Benoit et al. (2017). Table 1 presents a range of studies from the macroscopic systemic risk
literature, each of which features overlapping asset portfolios as a contagion channel for financial distress.
We present the method of price impact calculation deployed in the papers. Although the table features both
linear and exponential forms for price impact, the two forms are closely related. As Caccioli et al. (2014,
p.238) states, exponential price impact “corresponds to linear market impact for log-prices”. The papers
surveyed contain a mix of single- and multi-asset models. Some of these multi-asset models combine assets
into representative clusters which are referred to as asset classes. Models with a single asset are unable
to investigate the propagation of distress between assets, such as that encountered during flash crashes.
Models that use a representative asset class are unable to simulate the price dynamics of single assets and
so the details of liquidity provision are precluded from investigation. Finally, we note in Table 1 that the
majority of papers surveyed do not consider short selling (the action of borrowing assets to sell in the hope
of repurchasing at a lower future price, equivalent to taking negative positions). Such long-only models are
therefore precluded from investigating financial distress amplification mechanisms such as the short squeeze
(Dechow et al., 2001).
Linear price impact functions fail to capture the emergent and time-dependent nature of market liquidity
(the ability to freely buy and sell assets at current prices), the study of which falls within the market
microstructure literature (Gould et al., 2013). Events such as the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010 (Kirilenko
et al., 2017) demonstrate that price impact during crisis periods can be extreme. On that occasion, asset
prices exhibited unprecedented volatility as the orderly provision of market liquidity broke down. The event
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Paper Price impact Securities Investment
Nier et al. (2007) exponential† single long
Gai and Kapadia (2010) exponential† single long
Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) exponential† multiple‡ long
Cont and Wagalath (2013) linear multiple long/short
Huang et al. (2013) linear multiple long
Caccioli et al. (2014) exponential† multiple long
Di Gangi et al. (2018) linear multiple‡ long
Greenwood et al. (2015) linear multiple long
Caccioli et al. (2015) linear single long
Battiston et al. (2016) linear multiple long
Serri et al. (2016) linear multiple long
Cont and Schaanning (2017) linear multiple long
Table 1: A survey of price impact functions and portfolio investment constraints utilised in shared-asset models of financial
contagion. †corresponds to “linear market impact for log-prices” (Caccioli et al., 2014, p.238). ‡represents the set of equities
or bonds (for example) by a single representative asset class. Long and short refer respectively to positively and negatively
signed investments.
was also characterised by the high speed at which prices fell and subsequently returned almost to pre-crash
levels. Automated algorithmic trading systems were implicated in all phases of the Flash Crash, including
triggering the event, sustaining price falls, and facilitating eventual reversals (CFTC and SEC, 2010).
Two key and related mechanisms mean that crisis price impact is different from equilibrium price impact.
Cristelli et al. (2010) and Bookstaber and Paddrik (2015) argue that, during crises, market participants
refrain from placing orders. Easley et al. (2012) relate this phenomenon to the inferred presence of toxic
order flow, i.e. strongly directional price movements that are outside non-crisis bounds. This removal of
liquidity leads to sparsely populated LOBs, and as discussed by Farmer et al. (2004), gaps on the LOB can
lead to further large price movements.
Recent research has demonstrated the success of agent-based approaches in investigating intraday market
stability, and in particular the role of HFT (Menkveld, 2016) in liquidity provision and flash crashes e.g.
Hanson (2011); Johnson et al. (2012); Paddrik et al. (2012); Vuorenmaa and Wang (2014); Budish et al.
(2015); Jacob Leal and Napoletano (2017). Although these models are successful at reproducing stylized facts
of financial markets including during crises, attempts to extend these models to multi-asset or multi-venue
settings have been extremely limited.
Kirilenko et al. (2017) and Golub et al. (2012) take purely empirical approaches to understanding the
causes of the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010. Kirilenko et al. (2017) use regression analysis on a unique
dataset labelled with the identities of market participants. This analysis demonstrated that HFT activity
resulted in a “hot-potato” effect exacerbating price declines. Golub et al. (2012) looks at order placement
activity in markets one minute either side of mini-flash crash events (Johnson et al., 2012) finding HFTs
withdraw liquidity when it is needed most, at the same time as market makers and other liquidity providers.
Hanson (2011), Paddrik et al. (2012), Vuorenmaa and Wang (2014), and Jacob Leal and Napoletano
(2017) use combinations of agents representing low and high frequency market participants and are suc-
cessful at reproducing the characteristic price fall and recovery observed during flash crashes. Indeed, the
price recovery observed during flash crashes is another way in which crisis price impact differs from the
linear models used in the fire-sales literature. During the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010, financial distress
was observed to spread throughout equity and futures markets, making it a systemic event. However, mi-
crostructure models typically consider a single asset in isolation and do not incorporate network effects. This
is a significant limitation of current approaches, and further research is necessary if the systemic risk due to
flash crashes is to be successfully modelled and analysed Hanson (2011); Paddrik et al. (2012); Vuorenmaa
and Wang (2014); Jacob Leal and Napoletano (2017).
Microstructure models featuring multiple assets are rare in the literature. Gerig (2015) takes a model of
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informed (fundamentalist) and uninformed (zero-intelligence) traders across multiple assets and finds that
stocks with higher simulated HFT activity are more highly correlated. The authors also find that close price
coupling allows pricing errors to propagate more readily. However, the model does not specifically consider
network topology, financial stability, systemic risk, or flash crashes. Torii et al. (2015) consider a three-asset
agent-based model of arbitrage where an index future (a financial product constructed to track the combined
price movement of a set of underlying assets) is traded simultaneously with the set of underlying assets.
Torii et al. (2015) find that price shocks can propagate from asset to asset via movements in the index
future. The model does not consider the topology of the asset-index network, or flash crashes. However, this
is a notable result given the paucity of microstructure models considering the contagion of financial distress.
Cespa and Foucault (2014) consider a two-asset model for distress propagation where an “illiquidity cycle”
emerges as traders avoid changing their investments when price volatility leads to uncertainty and a reduced
“risk appetite”. As with other closed-form approaches, this model does not feature a realistic model of order
placement activity.
The purpose of the present paper is to provide a realistic microstructure model of price impact during
crisis periods, embedded within a multiple fund, multiple asset environment characteristic of models from the
macroscopic systemic risk literature. The model allows us to explore the propagation of financial distress
associated with inherently intraday market phenomena such as flash crashes. Events taking place over
timescales measured in minutes, seconds, or shorter are simply ignored in the overwhelming majority of
macroscopic financial models. However, the impact of such events can, as illustrated by the 6th May 2010
Flash Crash, be measured in trillions of dollars and serve to undermine the orderly functioning of global
financial markets.
3. A Micro-Macro Model
Our model features the novel synthesis of a macroscopic fund-asset network with a microscopic limit
order book trading simulation. When funds adjust their asset holdings, they do so by placing limit orders in
a realistically calibrated stock market model, where heterogeneous trading agents interact with the fund’s
orders. Price impact arises endogenously from our simulation, and resulting asset price movements affect
the profits and losses of the funds. In order to represent the composite micro-macro structure it is necessary
to introduce a set of heterogeneous interacting entities:
1. Banks: to model the provision of leveraged financing to institutions
2. Funds: to model institutions holding leveraged positions in risky assets
3. Assets: to model liquidity provision via the limit order book
4. Traders: to model realistic asset market activity and response to market distress
A summary of the agents and other entities in the model is presented in Figure 1. Dashed arrows indicate
secured margin loans extended by the single bank to the fund agents (for the sake of clarity only a small
number of funds and assets are represented). Solid arrows represent fund holdings in assets, and this section
of the system is what we refer to throughout this work as the “bipartite fund-asset network”. Finally, dotted
arrows indicate the order placement activity of the non-leveraged trader agents described in the previous
section.
In the sections that follow we will discuss how we capture these entities in our model, but we first present
the key assumptions underpinning the present work.
3.1. Assumptions
Before we describe in detail the components of our model, it is first necessary to establish the terms of
what the model does and does not set out to simulate.
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Bank
Fund Fund Fund Fund
Asset (LOB) Asset (LOB) Asset (LOB)
Non-leveraged traders (zero-intelligence)
Margin loan
Asset holding
Order flow
Figure 1: [1.5 COLUMN] Relationships between entities in the model. Arrows represent balance-sheet relationships. Between
banks and funds, these relationships refer to secured margin loans and leverage. Between funds and assets, the relationships
refer to asset ownership within fund portfolios. Similarly, between traders and assets the relationship again refers to asset
ownership in trader portfolios, though in the present model we assume that traders are non-leveraged and so not subject to
margin calls. Note that we do not model banks directly investing in assets.
3.1.1. Asset-related assumptions
Asset microstructure is represented using limit order books. Transactions occur when orders to buy (sell)
match against previously submitted orders to sell (buy) (Gould et al., 2013). Our asset model is supported
by the following key assumptions.
We assume:
• a single currency for all financial transactions in the model.
• that trading is costless in the sense that there are no commissions, exchange fees or rebates involved
in the model. Such costs are likely to be immaterial in comparison to the extreme price impact
encountered during flash crash type phenomena.
• that assets have no corporate actions such as splits or dividends (a minor assumption given the
timescale of corporate actions is weeks rather than intraday).
• that assets have the same liquidity and trading characteristics, as well as holding the same start price
at the beginning of simulation runs. The liquidity assumption can be compared to restricting our asset
universe to members of a major index such as the Eurostoxx 50 or S&P 500.
• that assets are not directly linked via derivative contracts such as options or via direct asset–asset
ownership. Such links introduce new potential channels for distress propagation and so our model is
conservative in this regard.
• that all trading takes place at a single trading venue. Market participant confusion over conflicting
data from alternative trading venues was implicated in the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010, and so again
our model represents a conservative configuration (CFTC and SEC, 2010).
3.1.2. Fund-related assumptions
Our research questions relate to how the fund-asset network impacts systemic risk (sections 6 and 7), in
the present work we therefore do not concern ourselves with how funds build positions first. We characterise
the funds in the model as large institutions that take a long time (many days at least) to accumulate
positions, and so over the short intraday timescales we wish to consider, such as the duration of a flash
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crash (minutes), their pre-crisis behaviour is irrelevant to our research questions. However, if a fund enters
distress via the enactment of a margin call, it becomes active and seeks to rapidly reduce leverage.
We assume:
• that funds already hold a set of asset positions before the simulation begins and do not adjust positions
unless experiencing financial distress.
• that funds do not invest directly in other funds (so-called fund-of-funds). As with asset-asset direct
linkage, our model takes a conservative stance in this regard.
• that funds deploy all of their capital as collateral for leverage loans and so have no cash reserves
available in order to satisfy margin calls. This implies that funds must liquidate (reduce in absolute
terms) asset positions in order to reduce leverage. Capital injection is equivalent to increased margin
tolerance, which we investigate comprehensively in the present paper.
• that funds liquidate aggressively (quickly, by taking liquidity), similarly to the empirical observations
by Adrian and Shin (2010) and the model by Greenwood et al. (2015).
• that when funds liquidate, they liquidate uniformly across their assets. This approach follows the
methodology established by Caccioli et al. (2014).
• that all funds in the simulation have equal starting capital (also as in Caccioli et al., 2014).
• that, in line with established methodology (see Table 1), asset positions are long-only (positive). This
strong assumption means that our present work fits into the fire sales literature (Shleifer and Vishny,
2011; Greenwood et al., 2015) and does not attempt to explain long-short phenomena such as the 2007
“Quant Meltdown” (Khandani and Lo, 2007)1.
3.1.3. Bank-related assumptions
In our model, financial distress propagates between funds connected via shared asset holdings. It is not,
therefore, necessary to consider interbank contagion in order to address our research questions. Neither
is it necessary for us to represent banks as directly owning assets; this behaviour is encapsulated entirely
within funds and so provides a clear separation of responsibilities without loss of generality. Our model thus
incorporates a single bank that provides leverage loans to all funds in the simulation.
We assume:
• that all funds in the simulation are offered equal leverage terms, following established methodology
(Caccioli et al., 2014).
• that fund portfolio constitution is ignored when banks set leverage limits. In reality, different assets
attract different levels of permissible leverage. Increased portfolio volatility reduces the cap and so
represents an additional channel of distress propagation. Our model is conservative with respect to
this effect, in line with the implicit methodology of related models.
• that banks monitor fund portfolios on an intraday basis and issue margin calls to funds whose current
leverage breaches some threshold. This assumption is realistic (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009;
Cont and Schaanning, 2017).
• that if a fund defaults (trading losses exceed capital) the bank will take over and liquidate the fund’s
portfolio. Margin terms typically provide for this repossession.
• that there are no other funding costs or interest charged by banks to funds. We justify this on the basis
of timescale — such fees are, in reality, accounted on a daily or monthly basis and are not material to
the short intraday timescales relevant to our research questions.
1Khandani and Lo (2007) and Cont and Wagalath (2013) argue that crowding at the trading strategy (or risk factor,
Fama and French, 1993) level describes the financial contagion observed during the “Quant Meltdown” more clearly than
consideration of individual investments in single financial securities.
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3.2. Agent-Based Model
In order to simulate the emergent properties of the interconnected, heterogeneous system of banks,
funds, assets and traders we implement an agent-based model (ABM). The ABM consists of software agents
representing banks, funds and traders. The model further incorporates assets and the markets for the trading
of those assets but these are not considered agents in their own right. Our notion of which entities in the
model constitute agents follows Wooldridge (2001, p.21):
“An agent is a computer system that is situated in some environment, and that is capable of
autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its delegated objectives.”
In the sections that follow we describe the behaviour of, and interconnections between, agents in the
model.
3.2.1. Banks
As discussed above, we model the activity of a single bank whose primary purpose is to provide leveraged
financing to funds. The bank is modelled by considering its balance sheet of assets and liabilities, in line
with existing approaches (Gai and Kapadia, 2010). The balance sheet for the bank in our model is presented
in Table 2.
Assets Liabilities
Margin lending Loss on margin loans
Cash Equity
Table 2: Bank balance sheet model. Equity is defined as the sum of assets minus the sum of liabilities.
As shown in Table 2 and discussed previously, we do not model interbank lending in the present work.
The function of the bank in our model therefore is to issue debt to funds which is secured using the fund’s
initial capital C0 ∈ R+ as collateral. Banks offer funds identical initial leverage λ0i = λ0,∀i ∈ {1, ..., nf},
λ0 ∈ R+. The total value Li of a loan made by the bank to the ith fund is therefore given by Li = C0i λ0i .
This expression demonstrates an important convention regarding leverage: the total cash available to funds
for the purposes of investment, V , is given by Vi = Li + C
0
i = C
0
i (λ
0
i + 1), so leverage of zero (λ
0 = 0)
corresponds to the case where Li = 0, that is, no cash is loaned.
As explained above, we assume that each of the nf funds utilise all of their available capital for the
purposes of funding asset positions. If we represent the investment of fund i in asset j as elements of a
matrix Aij then we may write C
0
i (λ
0
i +1) =
∑na
j=1Aij . If we further represent asset positions as the product
of asset price at time t, ptj ∈ R+, and position size in shares, Stij ∈ R, then for time t = 0 we can write
C0i (λ
0
i + 1) =
∑na
j=1 S
0
ijp
0
j , which makes explicit the relationship between leverage, capital, price and fund
asset holdings. As prices fluctuate the total fund portfolio value will also of course vary. This price variation
will result in mark-to-market profit and loss at various times accruing to the fund. This profit and loss is
combined with the fund’s capital yielding an updated capital at time t, Cti . We can thus derive the leverage
for fund i at time t, λti, which is given by
λti =
1
Cti
na∑
j=1
Stijp
t
j − 1.
As in Cont and Schaanning (2017), we assume that banks continuously measure the ratio τ = λt/λ0 for
all funds and issue margin calls when this ratio exceeds a critical hysteresis threshold τc ∈ [1,∞) (where
the infinite limit implies banks never issue margin calls, and the lower limit of 1 implies banks issue margin
calls for infinitesimally small fund losses). The margin call state remains in force at a fund until either the
fund reduces its leverage λti such that λ
t
i < λ
0
i , or the fund defaults (which occurs when C
t
i < 0). Note that
in our model the effect of a bank issuing a margin call to a fund is exactly equivalent to a fund managing
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its leverage to a target – a common industry practice (Cont and Schaanning, 2017). If a fund defaults, we
invoke the bank’s realistic prerogative to seize its assets and to continue to liquidate the positions.
Banks act autonomously in their decision as to whether and when to issue margin calls. Although we do
not explore bank decision-making in the present work, the possibility justifies our consideration of banks as
agents proper in the model.
3.2.2. Funds
The primary purpose of funds in the model is to accept leverage loans from banks and to use these loans
to finance a portfolio of assets (see Section 3.2.1). The model incorporates many funds, each with its own
randomly allocated portfolio (details of the allocation process are provided below). As asset prices vary as a
result of the microstructure simulation described in the next section, so the leverage of funds also varies as
profit and loss accrues to the fund’s account. If leverage increases beyond a critical threshold (see Section
3.2.1 for the mathematical details) the fund will enter a margin call state and will aggressively liquidate
its portfolio (details of the liquidation mechanism and how this relates to the microstructure model are
presented in Section 3.2.4 below). Funds can, in principle, decide autonomously which assets they elect to
liquidate. Indeed, Capponi and Larsson (2015) find that the strategic selection of asset liquidation behaviour
has a large impact on systemic risk in a macroscopic model. We do not consider this strategic behaviour
in the present work. Further fund autonomy manifests in the selection of distressed liquidation parameters,
and we explore systemic sensitivity to this in Section 5.
Funds are represented by their balance sheet, as shown in Table 3. As described previously, we do not
simulate the acquisition of fund asset portfolios, rather we specify portfolios as part of the initial conditions
of simulation runs. This approach allows us to explore portfolios with specific characteristics and their effect
on systemic risk.
Assets Liabilities
Capital Margin loan
Portfolio of assets Portfolio profit/loss
Equity
Table 3: Fund balance sheet model
3.2.3. Fund-Asset Bipartite Network
Following the approaches of Caccioli et al. (2014) and Huang et al. (2013) we define the random bipartite
graph (Newman, 2003) G = (X∪Y,E) in which edges E represent investments made by funds (bottom nodes,
X) in assets (top nodes, Y ) such that |X| = nf and |Y | = na. The structure of G can be represented by the
matrix A ∈ Rnf×na , defined in Section 3.2.1. A non-zero element Aij correspond to the presence of an edge
E ∈ G between fund i and asset j. A is thus the adjacency matrix representation of G (Newman, 2003).
We introduce two parameters to control the topology of G. The fraction of assets in which a fund
invests (the diversification, or density, Caccioli et al., 2014) is controlled by parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1], ρ ∈ R.
Funds are restricted such that they hold investments in at least one asset, that is, un-weighted fund degree
kfund = max(bρnac, 1). Since the same value of ρ is used for all funds, as ρ → 1, all funds converge to the
same portfolio (such that every fund invests in every asset). Conversely, ρ → 0 means each fund invests in
a single asset.
In order to generate networks with a controllable level of overlap, we introduce the notion of preferential
attachment (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999) governed by a parameter β ∈ R controlling the non-linear strength
of preferential attachment (Krapivsky et al., 2000). Starting with the set of assets, network construction
proceeds by adding funds sequentially. Each additional fund makes weighted connections to kfund different
assets. The probability that the fund connects with a given asset is related to the total already invested in
that asset, modulated by crowding parameter β. β = 0 generates a fully stochastic Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random
graph (Newman, 2003). β = 1 generates the linear Baraba´si-Albert model, and β > 1 generates a network
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ρ = 0
(a) (b) (c)
ρ = 0.5
(d) (e) (f)
ρ = 1
(g) (h) (i)
β < 0 β = 0 β > 0
Figure 2: [DOUBLE COLUMN] [IN COLOUR] Illustrative examples of the range of bipartite topologies that can be
generated with our network construction method. Top nodes (circles) represent assets, bottom nodes (squares) represent
funds. An edge between two nodes represents asset ownership by a fund. Panels on the same row have equal diversification
parameter ρ, and panels in the same column have equal crowding parameter β. Darker asset node shading indicates a higher
proportional amount invested in the asset.
in which funds have a very high probability of selecting assets that are already held by other funds. This
can leave some assets disconnected from the network in our model, and we account for this in the results
that follow. Our model also supports β < 0, which generates networks in which funds prefer to invest in
assets with the smallest existing investment. We refer to such network configurations as dispersed. Where
nf 6 na it is possible for each fund to invest in a different asset producing a maximally disjoint network
with no possibility of contagion between assets. Chen et al. (2014) find that such a network is the most
stable configuration in high-leverage scenarios and we seek to test this assertion in our micro-macro model.
Unlike Caccioli et al. (2014), we do not assume that funds make equal investments to each asset in their
portfolio. Instead, for each fund we sample kfund random variates from a Gaussian distribution N (0, 1),
normalising such that the absolute values of the variates sum to unity. Edges are added between the fund
and kfund assets with edge weights assigned in decreasing size order from the set of normalised variates.
Algorithm 1 in Appendix B presents the network construction method detail.
Figure 2 demonstrates the range of topologies that can be created using our bipartite preferential at-
tachment method (for clarity we present small networks in which nf = na = 4). Panels on the same row
have equal diversification parameter ρ, and panels in the same column have equal crowding parameter β.
Figure 2(a) shows a low density, dispersed configuration in which each fund holds a different asset. This
network is disconnected, prohibiting default cascades. As crowding parameter β increases in Figure 2(b),
the network becomes somewhat more connected with two funds sharing a common asset. The effect of
preferential attachment becomes apparent in Figure 2(c) where all funds invest in the same single asset,
leaving most assets disconnected from the network. Figures 2(d–f) illustrate higher diversification networks
with ρ = 0.5. In each case the network consists of a single connected component (disconnected assets are not
considered to be network components as they are effectively irrelevant to our simulation). It is possible in
connected networks for distress at any fund to affect (directly, or indirectly) all other funds. Finally, Figures
2(g–i) demonstrate that as ρ → 1 networks become complete (Newman, 2003). For complete networks it
may appear that crowding parameter β becomes degenerate, however, for weighted networks this is not
necessarily the case. Figures 2(h) and 2(i) demonstrate cases where some nodes receive higher investment
than others, even though all nodes have the same (unweighted) degree.
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3.2.4. Traders
Trader agents in our model operate in a single market, single asset capacity in line with the large majority
of the ABM micromarket literature. That is, a single trader agent is active in a single asset even though
it may be controlled by an entity with interests in multiple assets. Such considerations are of peripheral
importance in the present model since funds do not take an active trading role. Trader agents, furthermore,
are not considered to be leveraged and so will not be subject to margin calls.
Following well-established principles in the agent-based computational finance literature, we minimise
behavioural assumptions by endowing trader agents with minimal intelligence. This approach is known as
zero-intelligence (ZI), and is characterised by the lack of forecast capability or adaptation in agents (Gode
and Sunder, 1993; Farmer et al., 2005). Despite their apparent simplicity, such models are remarkably
successful at reproducing stylised facts of financial markets (Fagiolo et al., 2007; Panayi et al., 2012). To
be more specific, we reproduce the model presented in Paddrik et al. (2012) which features a heterogeneous
set of trader agents, each of which is in turn based upon behavioural observations of real world trading
behaviour on the day of the 6th May 2010 Flash Crash presented by Kirilenko et al. (2017).
Other models were also considered as a basis for the microscopic LOB simulation (Vuorenmaa and Wang,
2014; Hanson, 2011; Jacob Leal and Napoletano, 2017). All of these models feature a combination of low
and high-frequency trading and so are broadly similar, but the model presented in Paddrik et al. (2012) had
the advantage of removing any strategic choice on the part of agents and by doing so remaining closer to
the zero-intelligence principle. Paddrik et al. (2012) has the further advantage of featuring a realistic order
matching mechanism which is closer to real-world stock exchanges than any of the other models mentioned
above.
As in Paddrik et al. (2012), we assume agents arrive at the market according to a Poisson process with
a characteristic mean interaction interval specified per agent type (see Table 4). This approach is standard
for micromarket models (Farmer et al., 2005).
Type Timescale Inventory (shares) Population Inputs
Small 7200s (−∞,∞) 6500 –
Fundamental B/S 60s (−∞,∞) 2500 toxic order flow
Opportunistic 120s [−120, 120] 1600 stochastic signal
Market Maker 20s [−120, 120] 320 toxic order flow
HFT 0.35s [−120, 120] 16 LOB imbalance
Distressed 10s (−∞,∞) [1, nf ] market volume
Table 4: Trader agents in our model are based on Paddrik et al. (2012)’s model, which was calibrated to real market data
presented by Kirilenko et al. (2017).
We summarise the main features of the trader agents in Table 4. Detailed descriptions of the trader agent
types are provided in Appendix A and are closely related to the implementations described in (Paddrik
et al., 2012). However, the present model enhances the role of distressed selling agents from Paddrik et al.
(2012). The connection between the behaviour of the distressed selling agent and the liquidation behaviour
of a controlling fund agent is discussed in the next section.
3.2.5. Distressed Sellers
A single aggressive seller executing a large set of trades was identified as a key causative factor in the
6th May 2010 Flash Crash (Kirilenko et al., 2017). Distressed seller agents place market orders (orders with
quantity but no price limits) with an order size limited to a fixed percentage of the previous one-minute
trading volume. This facilitates a positive feedback loop if the placement of such orders causes market
volume to increase, leading to the placement of even larger orders as observed in the 6th May 2010 Flash
Crash. The distressed sellers in our model come from two sources:
1. Exogenous distressed sellers, introduced to shock the system, and
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2. Distressed sellers implementing the liquidation order placement of distressed funds.
First, as in (Paddrik et al., 2012), we introduce a distressed seller with a given position size at a specific
time point in the simulation purely to generate an asset price shock. We allow a period of 20% of the
simulation duration to elapse before shocking assets to allow initial transient effects to decay. This distressed
seller will continue to attempt to liquidate until it has sold its entire position, after which point it becomes
inactive. The second source of distressed sellers in our model are distressed funds. When a fund is in a
margin call or default state it is compelled to reduce leverage by liquidating asset positions. We model this
by introducing a distressed seller agent to the market for every asset that the fund chooses to liquidate (in
the present work, this is all assets held by the fund). The distressed seller attempts to reduce its parent
fund’s position in each asset to zero. Critically, however, if fund leverage falls back below the tolerance
threshold, liquidation is suspended, and the distressed agents representing the fund are deactivated. It is
possible that the fund may re-enter distress later and here the distressed selling agents would reactivate.
Our justification for this deleverage mechanism is that margin call terms usually stipulate that leverage
must be brought under control within a single trading day, thus necessitating immediate and robust action
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
3.2.6. Assets
Assets are not treated as agents in the model. Rather, assets represent the environment in which the other
agents are situated (Wooldridge, 2001). Assets can be bought and sold by trader agents utilising market and
limit orders via a realistic continuous double auction matching engine. The market clears according to the
industry-standard price-time priority (Gould et al., 2013), and agents are able to view the current state of
the market as represented by the LOB. Matched orders results in a trade, and the current price of the asset
is thus deemed to have been updated. The simulation is enhanced by the realistic inclusion of an opening
auction period and intraday volatility auctions. In both of these situations, market clearing is suspended for
a period of time to allow liquidity to accumulate on the LOB and hence aid price discovery. We assume an
initial one-minute opening auction phase and trigger realistically calibrated five-second volatility auctions
when prices fall by 1.3% in a single second, after Paddrik et al. (2012).
3.3. Systemic Risk Metrics
For a comprehensive survey of systemic risk metrics the reader is referred to Bisias et al. (2012) and
Acharya et al. (2017). For the present work we adopt two notions of systemic risk. The first is tailored to
distress at funds, and the second is tailored to distress in assets.
3.3.1. Financial Contagion
We have available several measures of fund distress: 1) fund profit and loss, 2) funds entering margin
call state, and 3) funds defaulting (when losses exceed capital). In the analysis that follows we adopt funds
entering default as our fund-level systemic risk metric. The advantage of this metric is that it represents an
extreme situation, more-so than merely entering margin call state, and also represents a terminal state of
the fund (funds do not participate further in the simulation once they are in default). Using profit and loss
would require the specification of the value of loss necessary to describe a fund as distressed. By using the
notion of default we automatically calibrate this threshold (the relationship between profit/loss and default
is stated in Section 3.2.1).
Following Caccioli et al. (2014) we measure financial contagion by considering the fraction of funds
that enter default in each simulation run. If at least γ = 5% of funds are in default by the end of the
simulation, we join Caccioli et al. (2014) in considering a default cascade to have occurred. We define the
probability of contagion as the fraction of Monte-Carlo trials (see Section 3.4) in which a default cascade
occurs. Again following Caccioli et al. (2014), we define the extent of contagion as the fraction of funds in
default, conditional on a default cascade having occurred. Formally, the probability of contagion is given by
Pcontagion =
1
M
M∑
m=1
Icascade(m), (1)
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where M is the number of Monte-Carlo trials for a single location in the parameter space. Icascade(m) is
an indicator variable representing the occurrence of a default cascade during trial m ∈ [1,M ], and is defined
as
Icascade(m) =
{
1 if fdefault(m) > γ,
0 otherwise,
(2)
where γ is a scalar threshold controlling the fraction of funds that must default before we consider a
default cascade to have occurred. fdefault(m), the fraction of funds entering default during Monte Carlo trial
m, is given by
fdefault(m) =
1
nf
nf∑
i=1
Idefault(i,m), (3)
where Idefault(i,m) is an indicator variable representing the default of fund i in trial m, and is defined as
Idefault(i,m) =
{
1 if fund i defaults in trial m,
0 otherwise.
(4)
The extent of contagion, Ωcontagion , is defined by Caccioli et al. (2014) as the expected fraction of funds
entering default, given a default cascade occurs. Formally, let us define D, the set of Monte Carlo trials in
which a default cascade occurs, such that D = {m ∈ [1,M ] : Icascade(m) = 1}, then we may write
Ωcontagion =
1
|D|
∑
m∈D
fdefault(m). (5)
Note that Ωcontagion is undefined if no default cascades occur, i.e. if Icascade(m) = 0 ∀ m ∈ [1,M ],
giving |D| = 0.
3.3.2. Flash Crash Occurrence
The second systemic risk notion concerns distress at assets, and here again we have a choice of possible
metrics. Paddrik et al. (2012) look at the lowest price attained by simulated assets, which has the benefit
of simplicity but lacks consideration of the time dimension so characteristic of flash crash phenomena.
Although price falls are indeed material to our investigation, our research questions are also concerned with
the speed at which distress propagates, and the temporal characteristics of sudden price movements are
better-described by metrics that are specifically designed to detect flash crashes. Johnson et al. (2012)
consider both price movement magnitude and timescale, but also require an unbroken sequence of trade
prices in a given direction (Johnson et al., 2012, p.3):
“For a large price drop to qualify as an extreme event (i.e. black swan crash) the stock price had
to tick down at least ten times before ticking up and the price change had to exceed 0.8%. ...
In order to explore timescales which go beyond typical human reaction times, we focus on black
swans with durations less than 1500 milliseconds”
We encountered difficulty calibrating Johnson et al. (2012)’s method. In particular the metric was not
found to be robust to simulation scaling (Section 3.4).
Vuorenmaa and Wang (2014) define a flash crash as a price fall of 10% followed by recovery of at least
50% of the size of the fall over an unspecified short timescale. Jacob Leal et al. (2016) use a similar metric
based on a price fall of 5% followed by an unspecified degree of reversion within a period of 30 minutes. The
dependence on price reversion in each of these metrics was found to be problematic for our model where
prices may not revert within the simulated timescale.
We define a flash crash as a price fall of 5% over a rolling 5-minute window. No further constraints are
applied. This metric was found to be robust to simulation scale, and to provide a better false positive rate
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than using the occurrence of volatility auctions (triggered by falls of 1.3% in a single second, see Section
3.2.6). Formally, let us define a variable, IFC , indicating the presence of a flash crash in asset j ∈ [1, na] at
time t ∈ [1, T ], as
IFC (j, t) =

1
(ptj − pt
′
j )
pt
′
j
< −0.05,
0 otherwise,
(6)
where pt
′
j is the price of asset j at max(t− 5 minutes, 0).
3.3.3. Flash Crash Propagation Speed
In addition to considering the fraction of assets experiencing flash crashes according to the above defini-
tion, we also consider the speed of flash crash propagation through the system. Propagation speed is only
well-defined where the number of assets experiencing flash crashes is at least two. We measure the time
since the start of the simulation run at which assets experience their first flash crash (individual assets may
go on to experience several flash crashes but we do not need to account for this in our propagation speed
metric). We then sort these time intervals in ascending order and take the time difference between the first
flash crash and the 80th percentile flash crash as a measure of the time taken for flash crash propagation
in the system. We scale this time interval inversely according to the number of assets that experience flash
crashes, giving a resulting metric with units of flash-crashes per minute.
Let us define the set F j of flash crashes experienced by asset j such that F j = {t ∈ [1, T ] : IFC (j, t) =
1}, where T is the total number of simulated time steps, and IFC (j, t) is the indicator variable defined above.
Let us further define a total order ≤j over F j , then we may label the elements tji ∈ Fj with indices
i ∈ [1, |F j |] such that tj1 ≤j tj2 ≤j ... ≤j tji ≤j ... ≤j tj|Fj |. We define the set F of first flash crashes
experienced by each asset in a single Monte Carlo trial as
F =
na⋃
j=1
{tj1}. (7)
We also define a total order ≤ over F . We label the elements ti ∈ F with indices i ∈ [1, |F|] such that
t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ... ≤ ti ≤ ... ≤ tp ≤ ... ≤ t|F|, where p is the index of the ζth fractile of the ordered set, i.e.
p = bζ|F|c. We fix ζ = 0.8 in the present work. Finally, we define the speed s of flash crash propagation by
s =
cζ(|F| − 1)
(tp − t1) , |F| > 1, (8)
where c is a dimensionless constant that allows us to convert from units of (time steps)
−1
to (minutes)
−1
.
If δt is the duration of one simulated time step in milliseconds, we have c = 60, 000δt−1.
An important feature of this metric is that it smooths out propagation speed for a given MC trial.
We observed that propagation speed exhibits non-uniform temporal structure including bursts of activity.
However, we also observed that the speed results are noisy and depend strongly on network topology (we
return to this matter in Section 7). The smoothing implicit in this metric therefore yields a more robust
estimate of the propagation speed than naively using the maximum speed attained in a given trial.
3.4. Simulation Protocol Summary
Our simulation proceeds according to the following steps:
1. Setup (meta): Exogenous selection of parameter space region to explore and the number of stochastic
Monte-Carlo (MC) trials to perform for each parameter setting. MC instances dispatched to high-
performance computing cluster.
2. Setup (per-trial): Construction of agents with stochastic parameters determined via pseudorandom
number generation, including fund–asset network construction.
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3. Intraday model: Simulate T = 100, 000 periods of market activity, each step lasting δt = 50 millisec-
onds.
4. Single period: Agents are selected for order placement according to a Poisson process. LOBs are
updated in industry standard price-time priority.
5. Shock: After T ∗ = b0.2T c periods to allow for the decay of initial transient effects, a distressed selling
agent is introduced for a single asset. Observation of subsequent system dynamics and measurement
of systemic risk.
6. Distributional outputs: Repeated stochastic MC trials facilitate the collection of distributional results.
Due to the stochastic, path-dependent nature of the model (a common feature of agent-based models), it
is necessary to perform repeated experimental trials in order to build statistical confidence in the observed
systemic dynamics (Fagiolo et al., 2017; Franke and Westerhoff, 2012). This approach, widely known as
Monte-Carlo (MC) sampling, induces a considerable computational burden. Our simulation protocol ac-
commodates the computational cost in two ways — firstly by making highly-parallel use of a distributed
high-performance computation cluster, and secondly by introducing judicious granularity into the agent sim-
ulation2. Facing similar computational constraints, Paddrik et al. (2012) introduce granularity by scaling the
number of trader agents in their simulation3. Table 4 gives unscaled agent populations. Following Paddrik
et al. (2012) we divide these populations by a factor of 32 (we found our systemic risk metrics were robust
to simulation at 1/32 or 1/4 scale). Since this scaling results in reduced LOB volume, it is also necessary to
scale agent inventory limits by the same factor. Agent activity timescales and order placement sizes are not
scaled. We adopt the same time granularity used in the flash crash model of Vuorenmaa and Wang (2014)
and set δt = 50ms. It is possible that the Poisson arrival processes governing agent timing result in more
than one agent being selected to place orders on a single LOB during a single time period. In such cases,
agent activation order is randomised. Since agents are therefore unable to have perfect knowledge of the
LOB at the exact time of their order placement, this randomisation places a lower-bound on agent trading
latency. The most active agents (HFTs) arrive at the market according to a characteristic timescale of 350ms
(see Table 4), about an order of magnitude slower than the minimal order placement latency supported in
our simulation.
3.5. Mathematical Notation
Table 5 presents a summary of the parameters used in this paper. The sampled domain for each parameter
is discussed at point of parameter usage in the results sections that follow. Table 6 summarises other non-
parameter notation.
4. Empirical Validation
Figure 3(a) demonstrates the output from a single evaluation of the ABM in which we simulate a single
asset and a single fund. The simulation comprises T = 100, 000 time steps each representing δt = 50ms for
a total of approximately 1.5 hours of simulated trading. The simulation was performed at 1/4 scale following
the method established by Paddrik et al. (2012).
The system is shocked after an initialisation period at t = 20, 000 by forcing the fund to liquidate all of
its inventory. The initial asset holdings of the shocked fund and its liquidation behaviour are calibrated to
generate equivalent sell order placement activity to that exhibited by the distressed trader in the 6th May
2010 Flash Crash (Kirilenko et al., 2017). Figure 3(a) shows the price evolution of the system (black, left
2Performance of the LOB software component was also found to be critical. We extended the implementation at
https://github.com/ab24v07/PyLOB accessed 2017-01-31, available under the MIT license and developed as part of Booth
(2016).
3Hayes et al. (2014) provide a reference software implementation at
https://github.com/uva-financial-engineering/JinSup accessed 2017-02-23, available under a permissive license.
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Symbol Name Theoretical Domain Sampled Domain
nf Number of funds N+ [0, 195]
na Number of assets N+ [1, 195]
Aij Asset portfolio values (nf × na) R [0,∼ $100mn]
Sij Asset portfolio positions (nf × na) N+ [0,∼ 100, 000]
M Number of Monte Carlo replicates N+ [1, 100]
T Number of simulated time steps N+ 100,000
δt Time step duration / milliseconds N+ 50
ρ Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network density [0, 1] [0, 1]
k Network degree of fund nodes N [1, 195]
σ Standard deviation of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi degrees [0,∞) 0.001
β Preferential attachment coefficient R [−7.5, 7.5]
λ0 Initial fund leverage R+ [1, 20]
C0 Initial fund capital /$millions R+ [0.25, 5]
τc Margin hysteresis critical value [1,∞) [1.001, 1.2]
θ Parameter triple (λ0, τc, C
0) - -
α Fund portfolio uniformity coefficient [0, 1] [0, 1]
η Distressed seller volume fraction R+ [0.05, 0.18]
δ Distressed seller timescale / s R+ [1, 60]
γ Default cascade indicator threshold (0, 1] 0.05
ζ Flash crash speed measurement percentile [0, 1] 0.8
Table 5: Parameters in the model. The sampled domain for each parameter is discussed at point of parameter usage in the
results sections.
hand axes) and the one-minute binned trade volume (red, right hand axes). We can see the characteristic
crash and recovery signature of a flash crash occurring around t = 60, 000. Market volume and market
volatility both increase while the distressed selling is taking place and return to pre-crash levels after the
distressed selling has concluded. The zero-intelligence nature of the trader agents precludes any temporally-
extended response to volatility and so, unlike in the real Flash Crash of 6th May 2010, the model does not
capture the extended period of volatility that followed the real crash (Kirilenko et al., 2017).
Figure 3(b) shows the total volume on the LOB during the simulation disaggregated into bid (black)
and ask (red) volumes. We can see that the available bid volume collapses following the introduction of the
distressed selling agent at t = 20, 000. As discussed in Section 3.2.4, the distressed selling agent places sell
market orders which aggressively remove liquidity from the bid side of the LOB. This figure clearly shows
the cause of the eventual flash crash — just before t = 60, 000 there is a brief period where buy-side liquidity
collapses to almost zero. In such a regime, the orderly provision of liquidity to the market has failed, and
stub quotes (orders placed far from prevailing prices that are not intended to transact) may be executed.
This is because market orders do not have price limits and so trades can occur at arbitrarily low prices
(Cristelli et al., 2010). Once the distressed selling has completed after t = 60, 000, buy side volume returns
to pre-distressed levels, and fundamental buyer agents are able to restore the price to pre-crash levels.
Figures 3(c–f) demonstrate that the model reproduces several important stylised facts of the market
(Cont, 2001; Kirman and Teyssiere, 2002; Chen et al., 2012). Figure 3(c) demonstrates that the model
produces heavy-tailed returns with a power-law tail. We give the mean cumulative distribution function
across 160 Monte-Carlo trials with 95% confidence intervals for trials with (red) and without (black) flash
crashes. For comparison, we also show Gaussian return distributions with mean and variance matched to
the observed results. Whether a flash crash occurs or not, the returns are heavy tailed. The heavy-tailed
nature is much enhanced where flash crashes do indeed occur.
Figure 3(d) demonstrates aggregational Gaussianity (Kirman and Teyssiere, 2002), whereby returns taken
over longer time horizons appear more Gaussian and less heavy-tailed. Again, we show 95% confidence
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Figure 3: [DOUBLE COLUMN] [IN COLOUR] Sample model output for a single asset. (a) price and volume series demon-
strating the occurrence of a flash crash event. (b) Total volume on bid (black) and ask (red) sides of the LOB demonstrating the
collapse of buy-side volume prior to the flash crash. The simulation lasts for T = 100, 000 × δt = 50ms simulated time steps,
therefore represents approximately 1.5 hours of market activity. (c) cumulative distribution function over price returns (log-log
scale). (d) return kurtosis measured over increasing time horizons (log-log scale). (e) demonstrating lack of autocorrelation of
price returns except at very short horizons (x-axis log scale). (f) demonstrating slowly-decaying autocorrelation of volatility
(log-log scale). For panels (c)-(f) we plot the mean across 160 Monte-Carlo trials with 95% confidence interval.
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Symbol Name Theoretical Range
Vi Total investment value for fund i R+
Li Total loan value made to fund i R+
ptj Price of jth asset at time t R+
Qbidj Total shares of jth asset at best bid price N+
Qaskj Total shares of jth asset at best ask price N+
Pcontagion Probability of contagion [0, 1]
Ωcontagion Extent of contagion [0, 1]
Table 6: Other notation used in this paper.
intervals around the mean across 160 Monte-Carlo trials disaggregated into trials with and without flash
crashes. We plot the kurtosis of the return distribution (a Gaussian distribution has kurtosis = 3). Both
series converge towards the Gaussian kurtosis level as we increase the measurement horizon over 10,000
simulated time-steps, and the decay is significantly more pronounced for trials with a flash crash.
Figure 3(e) demonstrates a lack of autocorrelation of price returns except at very short intraday timescales,
and Figure 3(f) demonstrates a long tail in the decay of autocorrelation of volatility (absolute return). Both
panels plot mean results across 160 Monte-Carlo trials with 95% confidence intervals. The slow decay of
autocorrelation is markedly slower for trials exhibiting flash crash phenomena. These results are consistent
with empirically-observed stylised facts (Cont, 2001).
Paddrik et al. (2012)’s model formulation requires all order placement by all agents to be within ten
ticks (quantised minimum price increments on the LOB) of the current best price. Their model is therefore
precluded from generating the long tailed relative price stylised fact reported by Zovko et al. (2002). A
consequence of that modelling decision is that their model does not generate stub quotes. As a result, the
Paddrik et al. (2012) flash crash price gradient appears shallow relative to an empirical flash crash or those
generated by other models such as Vuorenmaa and Wang (2014). Our model relaxed the ten-tick assumption
for the small trader agents only, permitting them to place orders at up to one-thousand ticks away from
best. This resulted in an as-expected improvement in the model’s ability to reproduce the relative price
stylised fact. Flash crashes generated under this relaxed assumption exhibit a steeper price gradient, in
better agreement with empirical data (Figure 3(a)).
For all of these simulations we held-fixed the distressed selling agent properties. Flash crash occurrence
is, however, strongly dependent on the price impact of the distressed selling agent’s orders, which we would
expect in turn to strongly depend on order size and order placement rate (Paddrik et al., 2012). We explore
this matter in the next section.
5. Trading Behaviour and Asset Price Shocks
The distressed selling agent in the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010 reportedly placed market orders sized to
not exceed 9% of trailing one-minute market volume (Kirilenko et al., 2017). They furthermore executed a
sequence of orders intended to achieve their total desired sell volume over a period of 20 minutes. Although
Paddrik et al. (2012) and Paddrik et al. (2015) investigate sensitivity to the volume limit (η in our notation),
they do not investigate sensitivity to the placement rate (δ in our notation). We find that flash crash
occurrence is critically sensitive to both parameters.
In this experimental scenario we retained the single-fund, single-asset structure adopted in the previous
section. The method of shock delivery via the complete liquidation of the fund portfolio is also retained.
We performed a combinatorial evaluation over the parameter space η ∈ [0.005, 0.15] and δ ∈ [1, 60] sampling
77 parameter pairs. For each parameter pair we performed 100 Monte-Carlo trials. Each trial was classified
according to whether a flash crash was observed in the simulated asset price time-series. We define flash
crash occurrence as a price fall exceeding 5% in a period of 5 minutes (see Section 3.3.2 for details regarding
this metric).
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(b) Time interval prior to flash crash occurrence following the onset of distressed selling.
Figure 4: [DOUBLE COLUMN] [IN COLOUR] Single asset flash crash (a) occurrence and (b) time interval prior to
occurrence as a function of distressed selling agent properties. η refers to the order size limit as a fraction of rolling one-minute
market volume. δ refers to the mean interval between sell order placements in seconds. We show the mean and 95% confidence
intervals sampled over 100 Monte Carlo trials.
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The mean and 95% confidence intervals for Monte Carlo results are plotted in Figure 4(a). What can
be clearly seen in this figure is that flash crashes tend to occur with higher probability as the sizes of orders
placed increase, and as the interval between order placements decreases. Both of these findings are consistent
with the notion that a flash crash occurs when there is insufficient buy-side liquidity to meet elevated sell-
side demand, possibly exacerbated by algorithmic traders withdrawing liquidity from the market. We find
that, for any given order size limit in the regime studied, it is possible to reduce the probability of flash
crash occurrence by increasing the interval between order placements. Figure 4(a) also demonstrates that
for a given order placement interval, δ, there exists a critical value of the order size limit, η, below which
flash crashes occur with negligible probability. Two traders placing equally-sized orders at equal timescales
δ is exactly equivalent to a single trader placing orders with a timescale δ′ = δ/2.
The distressed seller implicated in the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010 reportedly used a value of η = 0.09
(Kirilenko et al., 2017). We calibrate this parameter setting in our model using this reported value, and
retain this setting for the remainder of this paper. Although we are not able to calibrate the order placement
rate in a similar manner, we select δ = 10s as a reasonable setting based on the results in Figure 4(a). Figure
4(b) implies that this choice of η and δ is sufficient to induce a flash crash within approximately two minutes
of the onset of distressed selling.
6. Leverage, Capital, and Margin Tolerance
Previous sections have established the effectiveness of the model at reproducing stylised facts of real
financial markets, as well as its ability to exhibit flash crashes. We now proceed to consider a full simulation
of multiple connected funds and assets, as opposed to the single-fund single-asset simulations studied in
previous sections.
In this section, we consider the response of the system to changes in fundamental parameters related to
margin tolerance (τc), leverage (λ
0) and fund capital (C0). We find that the multi-asset system exhibits
phase changes for critical values of each of these parameters, moving from a stable phase where it is unlikely
for fund defaults and flash crashes to occur, to an unstable phase where catastrophic collapse becomes highly
likely.
Formal definitions of our systemic risk metrics for fund default cascades and asset flash crash occurrence
are given in Section 3.3. In brief, we consider a default cascade to have occurred if more than γ = 5% of
funds end the simulation in default. We further define the extent of a default cascade to be the fraction
of funds in default, conditional on a default cascade having occurred. Both of these metrics follow the
methodology of Caccioli et al. (2014). We also introduce our own metric for flash crash occurrence, which
we define as an asset price fall of 5% within a rolling five minute window.
6.1. Experiment Parameters
For this experimental scenario we perform a combinatorial exploration over parameter triples θ(λ0, τc, C
0)
for λ0 ∈ [1, 20], τc ∈ [1.002, 1.1] and C0 ∈ [0.1, 5.0] $millions (210 total combinations). The analysis
performed by Ang et al. (2011) suggested that real-world λ0 typically lies within [1, 20] for hedge funds
trading equities. Since we do not have access to an independent data source for our calibration, we adopt
Ang et al. (2011)’s suggested domain. Analysis of the 6th May 2010 Flash Crash implied the size of sell
orders sent by the distressed trader totalled 75,000 (Kirilenko et al., 2017). We sample C0 ∈ [0.1, 5.0] such
that in combination with λ0 (see Section 3.2.1 for details), the positions held by funds extend from the region
whereby full liquidation of a single fund could not induce a flash crash even if all of its holdings were allocated
to a single asset, to the region whereby liquidation of a single fund could indeed induce a flash crash. We
do not have access to empirical data on margin hysteresis τc and so here we perform a logarithmic sampling
across three orders of magnitude4 in order to determine sensitivity to this parameter. In combination, these
parameter domains are sufficient to determine the boundary in (λ0, τc, C
0) space separating stable from
4i.e. we sample τc − 1 = τ ′c ∈ [0.002, 0.1].
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Figure 5: [DOUBLE COLUMN] [IN COLOUR] Probability of contagion as a function of leverage (λ0), margin hysteresis
(τc) and fund capital (C0). Plotted values are the mean across Monte-Carlo trials as a function of λ0 and C0. τc increases
from panel to panel thus we present slices of the full three-dimensional parameter space at fixed values of τc. Contour lines are
drawn to denote fractional default at the 25% and 75% levels. In region I most funds avoid default, but in region II it is likely
that all funds end up in default. In the upper-right panel we label three points in (λ0, τc, C0) parameter space θ?1 ,θ
?
3 , andθ
?
3 .
We refer to these in detail in Section 7.
unstable behaviour. Each parameter triple, θ, is evaluated over five Monte-Carlo trials5 resulting in a total
of 1050 ABM evaluations. Only the pseudorandom number seed is varied between Monte-Carlo trials.
For each evaluation we generate a new set of fund-asset allocations according to the algorithm presented in
3.2.3. Allocations are stochastic with a fixed diversification coefficient ρ = 0.5 and no preferential attachment
(β = 0). The topology may therefore be represented as an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph (Newman, 2003) in
which, on average, edges exist between each fund node and 50% of the available asset nodes. We consider the
effect of topology in the next section. Finally, we fix the number of assets and funds at na = nf = 50. These
selections strike a balance between computational tractability and providing fine enough grained distinction
for metrics such as flash crash propagation speed and extent. For the present study, all funds have the same
level of capital C0 and initial leverage λ0.
The system is perturbed with an exogenous shock according to the same protocol as that presented in
previous sections. We introduce a distressed seller to a single asset (selected from a uniform distribution
across all assets that are held by at least one fund). The distressed agent places a sequence of sell orders
with a total quantity of shares that is calibrated to trigger a flash crash in the shocked asset. No further
exogenous interventions are performed, and further episodes of distressed selling by funds and asset flash
crashes arise endogenously.
6.2. Parameter Space Exploration
Figure 5 shows the fraction of funds entering default (mean across Monte-Carlo trials) as we perform the
combinatorial search. τc is increased from panel to panel thus we present slices of the full three-dimensional
5The low number is due to computational constraints which can be improved in future studies.
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parameter space at fixed values of τc. It is clearly seen from this figure that a phase-change exists in leverage-
capital space, whereby the likelihood of funds entering default increases from approximately zero (region
I) to approximately 100% (region II). This result is consistent with expectations because a larger value of
leverage λ0 magnifies fund losses in response to a given asset price move, making margin calls more likely.
This effect is directly mitigated by increasing margin tolerance τc. Conditional on a margin call being in
force, larger fund capital C0 means that a greater quantity of shares will need to be sold by the fund, which
therefore implies a greater price impact when that fund elects to sell, propagating greater losses to other
funds that hold positions in the same assets. Systemic sensitivity to the topological properties of overlapping
(crowded) asset portfolios are explored in detail in Section 7.
Although it is not easy to see in Figure 5, a phase change also occurs over the domain of τc. In order to
make this more apparent, we performed linear sensitivity analyses of the three variables in isolation, holding
the other two variables fixed. The three sampled lines intersect at θ?1 = θ(λ
0 = 3, τc = 1.01, C
0 = 1). Figure
6(a) plots the probability of contagion for these linear explorations, showing 95% confidence intervals around
the mean. This figure clearly demonstrates the phase changes in all three variables under consideration.
The change from stability to instability occurs as leverage and capital increase and as margin tolerance
decreases. We further observed that the extent of contagion was always 100%, conditional on the occurrence
of a default cascade. This result adds evidence in support of existing studies. Similarly to Huang et al.
(2013), we find that increasing margin tolerance (τc) reduces the likelihood of systemic failure, and also that
increasing price impact correspondingly increases systemic risk. In our model, price impact is a function
of the distressed liquidity entering the market which, by construction, is an increasing function of leverage
(λ0) and capital (C0).
Figure 6(b) plots the speed of flash crash propagation for the linear explorations. As discussed in
Section 3.3.3, the speed we report here is inversely related to the time taken for 80% of subsequent flash
crashes to occur, following the observation of the first flash crash. These results demonstrate that flash
crash propagation speed is an increasing concave function of leverage and capital, and a decreasing convex
function of margin hysteresis, similarly to the probability of contagion result. Margin hysteresis has a
dramatic damping effect on flash crash propagation speed, reducing propagation speeds close to zero for
τc > 1.03. These results are straightforward to explain. Increasing leverage makes funds more sensitive
to price changes at an asset, making funds more likely to commence distressed selling for a given asset
price move, and hence more readily propagating price impact between assets. Increased capital means
that, conditional on distressed selling taking place, a fund will sell a larger quantity of shares, resulting in
steeper price impact in assets that are being sold. This in turn means that the conditions satisfying our
flash crash metric (a fall of 5% within a rolling 5 minute window) will be satisfied sooner than under lower
capital conditions. The effect of increasing margin hysteresis is predominantly in opposition to the effect of
increasing leverage. However, conditional on flash crashes occurring under high margin tolerance, the total
quantity of shares to be unwound will be higher than when tolerance is small. This leads to a mixed effect
of the margin tolerance parameter.
Finally, Figure 6(c) illustrates the time taken for the second flash crash to occur following the introduction
of an exogenous shock to the system. The first flash crash typically occurs in the asset receiving the
exogenous shock, so by measuring the time of the second flash crash we probe the systemic nature of flash
crash propagation across the fund–asset network. These results are again consistent with expectations and
demonstrate that higher values of λ0 and C0 destabilise the system, causing flash crashes to occur more
rapidly following commencement of distressed agent selling. Increasing the margin tolerance τc stabilises
the system, leading to larger intervals between shock delivery and flash crash onset.
Our model continues to support the conclusions of models with a similarly-structured macroscopic net-
work component. Our work goes further by allowing detailed consideration of distress propagation speeds
and of the intraday mechanism by which contagion occurs. Price impact in real markets does not occur
instantaneously, rather it manifests across longer time periods while trading strategies are in operation.
The realistic calibration of the microstructure component of our model allowed us to show that the market
quickly reacts to initial distress, leading to contagious spreading of flash crashes across the network in a
matter of minutes. This short time interval places an upper bound on the window for the deployment of
ex post regulatory interventions. Our results demonstrate that increasing margin tolerance provides the
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(a) Probability of contagion as we systematically adjust one variable, holding the other two fixed.
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(b) Flash crash propagation speed as we systematically adjust one variable, holding the other two fixed.
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Figure 6: [DOUBLE COLUMN] [IN COLOUR] Exploring financial stability as we systematically adjust one agent pa-
rameter, holding the other two fixed. The exogenous variables are Left panels: leverage λ0, Middle panels: margin hysteresis
τc, Right panels: capital C0 (units millions of US dollars, MUSD). We plot the mean across 100 Monte-Carlo trials, along with
95% confidence intervals. The intersection in parameter space is at θ?1(λ
0 = 3, τc = 1.01, C0 = 1). The results demonstrate
phase changes for each of the three parameters from stable to unstable behaviour.
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most effective route to increasing the size of the ex post intervention window. However, the short timescale
associated with this window across large regions of the parameter space suggests that ex ante precautions
may have higher efficacy than ex post alternatives.
7. Bipartite Network Topology
Previous works such as Acemoglu et al. (2015) and Gai and Kapadia (2010) have established the impor-
tance of network topology when considering the systemic risk associated with financial distress propagation.
Gai and Kapadia (2010) introduce the notion of robust-yet-fragile networks in which higher network connec-
tivity is advantageous for stability in the presence of small shocks as banks are able to share losses and avoid
default. On the other hand, high interconnectedness becomes problematic during high shock conditions by
providing a large number of channels for distress propagation. Acemoglu et al. (2015) similarly argue that
in low-shock regimes, more highly-connected networks are more stable. In this section we explore the extent
to which these findings apply to a joint micro-macro model of systemic risk due to overlapping portfolios.
In Section 6 we represented the fund-asset allocation network as an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph (Newman,
2003). We held fixed both the topology and the graph density which was characterised by the fund’s average
asset diversification ρ = 0.5. We now discuss systemic risk when network density and topology are varied.
7.1. Experiment Parameters
Using the bipartite network generation algorithm, we construct networks in which funds exhibit varying
degrees of asset diversification (controlled by parameter ρ) and also varying degrees of preferential asset
attachment (controlled by parameter β).
As in Section 6 where we looked at leverage dependence, we continue with a 50-asset, 50-fund model6.
We perform a combinatorial set of evaluations for ρ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [−7.5,−2, 0, 2, 7.5] yielding a total of
35 parameter pairs. Each pair was evaluated over 100 Monte-Carlo trials in which only the pseudorandom
number generator seed varied between simulation instances.
Based on the results from Section 6 we chose three fixed points in (λ0, τc, C
0) space. These locations
are depicted in the upper-right panel of Figure 5 and are presented in Table 7. We performed a total of
10,500 ABM evaluations, each consisting of T = 100, 000 time steps, each step with a simulated resolution
of δt = 50ms.
As in previous sections, we introduce an exogenous shock to a single asset in the form of a distressed
selling agent, calibrated to place a sequence of orders sufficient to trigger a flash crash in the selected asset.
We select the asset to shock uniformly from the set of assets that are held by at least one fund. In this
way we avoid shocking assets that are disconnected from the network. Formally, let us define the set of
connected assets A = {j : ∑nfi=1Aij > 0, j ∈ [1, na], j ∈ N+}, then the probability of selecting an asset
j′ ∈ A as the single asset to receive the exogenous shock is equal to 1/|A|.7
6The effect of variable network size was found to be similar to the effect of diversification parameter ρ and so we choose to
frame our discussion in terms of ρ for the sake of brevity.
7We further require that if more that 80% of funds are connected in a giant network component, then the shock must be
delivered to an asset that is also connected to the same component. This is to reduce the impact of spurious outliers and noise
in the results and does not affect our conclusions.
λ0 τc C
0 leverage regime stability†
θ∗1 3 1.01 1 high typically unstable
θ∗2 2 1.01 0.5 medium moderately stable
θ∗3 1.5 1.01 0.25 low typically stable
Table 7: Locations in (λ0, τc, C0) space which are fixed during topology experiments. These points are depicted in Figure 5.
†We report the stability at ρ = 0.5, β = 0, nf = na = 50, which is consistent with parameter selection in Section 6.
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7.2. Probability and Extent of Contagion
Figure 7 presents the probability (left column) and extent (right column) of contagion as we vary network
diversification (ρ) and crowding parameter (β). We present results for three leverage scenarios: high leverage
(θ∗1 , top row), medium leverage (θ∗2 , middle row) and low leverage (θ∗3 , bottom row). We find that systemic
risk is strongly dependent on each of these system parameters.
Figure 7(a) shows that default cascades occur with high probability for all but the smallest values of
diversification parameter ρ. When ρ is less than 3%, funds invest in a single asset8. At low diversification,
we find that the system is most stable for dispersed configurations (β < 0). This corresponds to topologies in
which each fund invests in a different asset, and so distressed selling by one fund cannot affect the portfolios
of other funds (see Table 8). Chen et al. (2014) find a similar result for their purely analytic model. When
diversification is low, we also observe that crowded systems (β > 1) are the least stable. This corresponds
to a topology in which all funds invest in the same single asset. This has two implications — first that
a falling price of this asset will simultaneously affect all funds, and second that distressed selling by any
fund will necessarily affect the single jointly-held asset. Both factors contribute to increased price impact at
the jointly-held asset and hence flash crash propagation in the system. As diversification increases beyond
ρ = 0.03, the system becomes less stable for all crowding regimes. In high leverage scenarios, we therefore
find that increasing diversification does not improve systemic stability. Rather, increased diversification
allows contagion to spread freely to more of the assets and funds in the network. Acemoglu et al. (2015)
find a somewhat analogous effect when comparing the size of shocks delivered to their system. However,
a surprising result emerges as crowding (β) increases. It is not obvious what mechanism acts to increase
system stability as a function of higher portfolio overlap for moderate and high levels of diversification in
this high leverage regime. This finding is not consistent with existing literature, and we return to consider
it in detail in Section 7.4.
Figure 7(c) presents the probability of contagion in a moderate leverage regime. At very low diversifica-
tion we again observe that the system is most stable for dispersed configurations (β < 0). We may attribute
this finding to the network topology which consists of disjoint sub-graphs in which each fund invests in a
single asset, and each asset is held by exactly one fund. We find that cascades cannot propagate as the
network is too sparsely connected, similar to the findings by Caccioli et al. (2014). As diversification in-
creases to 5–10% we observe a marked reduction in system stability for all crowding regimes. At this level
of diversification the network is sufficiently connected for distress to propagate. However, as diversification
increases further we find that systemic risk is reduced which is again consistent with Caccioli et al. (2014),
who found that increased diversification means that distress at a fund will be spread between a larger num-
ber of assets and so have a smaller effect on any one asset. In the moderate leverage regime, we find that
distress at a fund is less likely to cause a flash crash at a given asset. This stands in contrast to the high
leverage scenario discussed previously where even fully diversified funds can still have sufficient price impact
to trigger flash crash cascades. Highly-crowded regimes (β > 0) also benefit from increased diversification,
however such regimes are always less stable than non-crowded regimes. This result is to be expected: when
portfolios are strongly-overlapping, distress at a single asset is felt by a large fraction of funds. Distress at
a single fund is therefore more readily felt by other funds in crowded regimes.
Figure 7(e) presents results when leverage is further decreased. We find that crowded regimes remain the
least stable, regardless of the level of portfolio diversification. However, the figure shows that the benefits
of portfolio diversification manifest at lower levels of diversification parameter ρ. In particular, no default
cascades are observed for ρ > 0.75. When funds utilise low leverage, they are relatively insensitive to price
movements of the assets in their portfolios and so even modest levels of diversification are sufficient to avoid
the need for funds to engage in distressed selling. In the low leverage regime our results are consistent
with those of Chen et al. (2014) who find that systemic risk is minimised when all funds hold the “market
portfolio”, which in our notation corresponds to maximum diversification (ρ = 1).
Figures 7(b), 7(d) and 7(f) demonstrate that when default cascades are observed, they typically affect
the entire network. That is, the extent of contagion is 100% for anything other than very low levels
8Recall kfund ≈ max(ρna, 1), and na = 50 in the present experiment.
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β 〈nCf 〉 95% interval
-7.5 1.52 1.42 – 1.62
-2.0 2.56 2.45 – 2.67
0.0 3.80 3.64 – 3.96
2.0 11.2 10.6 – 11.7
7.5 45.9 45.1 – 46.7
Table 8: Presenting the mean and 95% confidence interval of nCf , the number of funds in the largest connected component of
the nf = na = 50 fund–asset network when ρ→ 0, i.e. kfund = 1, for different choices of crowding parameter β. Statistics are
generated from an ensemble of 100 random networks.
of portfolio diversification. In the moderate and low leverage regimes the system is “robust-yet-fragile”
(Gai and Kapadia, 2010) for higher levels of diversification. Although default cascades are unlikely in
such regimes, when they do occur the distress propagation is extensive. In each leverage regime, at low
diversification the extent of contagion is highest for more highly-crowded systems. This effect is most
pronounced in the moderate leverage regime. In the low leverage regime we did not observe cascades for
many parameter combinations and so the (conditional) extent of contagion is undefined (this results in partial
series, particularly noticeable in figure 7(f)). When diversification is low, dispersed network topologies
can become disconnected. Contagion is limited to the connected component (sub-graph) containing the
exogenously-shocked asset, resulting in an extent of contagion of less than 100%.
The presence of “robust-yet-fragile” behaviour creates a problem for policy-makers (Gai and Kapadia,
2010). Although systemic failure can be made less likely by encouraging higher portfolio diversification at
funds, if a cycle of deleveraging takes hold, enhanced diversification means that financial distress spreads
more extensively through the network of funds and assets, resulting in increased financial damage to the fund
sector overall. In the next section we consider the dynamic nature of the spread of distress and investigate
the speed of flash crash propagation as a function of network topology.
7.3. Flash Crash Propagation Speed
Figure 8 presents the speed of flash crash propagation as a function of fund and asset diversification in
the same three leverage regimes described in the previous section. As mentioned previously, and discussed in
detail in Section 3.3.3, the speed we report here is inversely related to the time taken for 80% of subsequent
flash crashes to occur, following the observation of the first flash crash.
Figure 8(a) demonstrates that at high leverage, portfolio crowding makes little difference to the speed at
which flash crashes propagate between assets. Instead, the speed strongly depends on network diversification
(β, in our notation). The previous section established that under high leverage, enhanced diversification
is not beneficial to systemic stability. Figure 8(a) shows that enhanced diversification leads to faster flash
crash propagation between assets. The apparent stimulating effect of diversification on propagation speed
may indicate that if a set of deleveraging funds wields enough market impact to cause a flash crash in one
asset, it likely also wields enough market impact to cause a flash crash in many assets (it is unlikely to have
exactly the right level of impact needed to distress one and only one asset) and so enhanced diversification
can simply become an enhanced channel for distress propagation. Enhanced diversification also implies that,
conditional on entering distress, a fund will send sell orders to a larger fraction of assets in the network. Under
high leverage, the resulting price impact causes these assets to undergo flash crashes at similar times during
the simulated trading session, resulting in a higher speed measurement. The observed maximum speed of
approximately 200 flash crashes per minute corresponds to a time difference of just 5 minutes between the
first flash crash and the 80th percentile flash crash. Such a short window places strict constraints on any
ex post regulatory interventions, and instead indicates that ex ante measures may be more useful as policy
tools.
Figure 8(b) presents flash crash propagation speed results in a moderate leverage regime. Here we find
that speed remains low regardless of diversification for non-crowded portfolios. In the previous section we
observed that default cascades were unlikely for moderate to high diversification for moderate leverage and
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Figure 7: [DOUBLE COLUMN] [IN COLOUR] Probability (a,c,e) and extent (b,d,f) of a default cascade as a function of
portfolio diversification (ρ) and crowding (β) parameters. The analysis is repeated for three leverage regimes denoted {θ∗1 ,θ∗2
and θ∗3} in decreasing order of magnitude.
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low crowding (Figure 7(c)). However, cascades were observed to occur for low diversification in this regime.
The low speed at which flash crashes propagate from asset to asset in this case may be due to the fact that
the fund-asset network is only sparsely connected, meaning that the effective network diameter (in a graph-
theoretic sense) is higher. A higher diameter implies that some assets are more weakly-connected to the
network and hence distress takes longer to propagate to such nodes. The results for high-crowding regimes
are similar to those for high-crowding regimes at higher leverage, though this observation only holds for low
to moderate diversification ρ. When ρ increases beyond approximately 50% Figure 8(b) shows that increased
diversification reduces flash crash contagion speed. We note that when portfolios are maximally diversified,
there can be little difference between crowded and non-crowded configurations (we revisit this notion in the
next section), and so it is not surprising that the flash crash propagation speed is similar for crowded and
non-crowded topologies when ρ → 1.0. However, it is not obvious why speed should peak near ρ = 0.5.
As density increases from ρ = 0 to ρ = 0.5 in crowded regimes (β > 0), the number of assets that have
non-negligible levels of investment increases. Crucially, however, at low density the effect of this increase is
detrimental to systemic stability (as we saw in the previous section). It is not until density increases further
that diversification acts to stabilise lower-leverage systems. It is interesting that the peak of flash crash
contagion speed occurs at a higher value of the diversification, ρ, than the peak probability of contagion.
This could be due to the conditional nature of the speed measurement. Speed is only defined when more
than one asset experiences a flash crash, and this is likely highly correlated with cases where default cascades
occur. If we only consider cases where default cascades occur, it does not necessarily follow that the speed,
under this condition, will be maximised at the same level of diversification as the unconditional systemic
stability.
Figure 8(c) presents similar results for a low leverage scenario. Again we see that more crowded systems
exhibit higher flash crash propagation speed regardless of portfolio diversification, and that the speed reaches
a maximum at an intermediate level of diversification. The figure clearly shows that the maximal propagation
speed, for crowded scenarios, occurs at a lower level of diversification coefficient ρ for the low leverage
scenario, compared to the moderate leverage scenario. This finding is broadly consistent with Figures 7(c)
and 7(e) which find that probability of contagion reaches a maximum for lower values of ρ for low leverage
scenarios compared to moderate leverage scenarios. Since flash crash contagion speed is only defined for
Monte Carlo trials where at least two assets experience flash crashes, Figure 8(c) features incomplete series9.
Taken together, Figures 8(a)-(c) demonstrate that flash crash propagation speed increases as leverage
increases. The results also demonstrate that for high-crowding regimes, speed is a non-monotone function
of portfolio diversification. The non-monotonicity is related to similar non-monotonicity observed for the
probability of contagion in Section 7.2, though the maxima occur at different levels of diversification when
considering speed as opposed to stability. We have also found that, similar to the systemic stability results,
dispersed configurations and configurations with no crowding have the lowest flash crash propagation speed.
This means that they are not only more robust to default cascades, but also that in such scenarios regulators
have a larger time window in which to deploy ex post interventions should a deleveraging event occur.
7.4. Effect of asset allocation distribution
In Section 7.2 we found the surprising result that in certain circumstances, increased portfolio crowding is
beneficial to systemic stability. We are not aware of previous studies that have encountered this phenomenon.
It is not apparent in Caccioli et al. (2014) or Chen et al. (2014). In this section we present evidence in support
of the hypothesis that the effect is due to the non-uniformity of fund investments between the assets in their
portfolio. We thus establish the importance of considering non-uniform asset allocations in future studies.
With reference to Figure 7(a), we consider the probability of contagion in the high leverage scenario θ∗1 .
We observe that a higher crowding parameter β results in a reduced probability of contagion for most values
of portfolio diversification ρ, and that this effect becomes more pronounced as ρ increases. This is surprising
9We also only report results for Monte Carlo trials with valid distributions. This means that certain parameter settings
where only a single Monte Carlo replicate resulted in a valid speed measurement are suppressed as it is not possible to give
confidence intervals in such cases.
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Figure 8: [DOUBLE COLUMN] [IN COLOUR] Flash crash propagation speed (minutes-1)through the fund–asset network
as a function of portfolio diversification (ρ) and crowding (β) parameters. The analysis is repeated for three leverage regimes
denoted {θ∗1 ,θ∗2 ,θ∗3} in decreasing order of magnitude.
because ρ→ 1 implies that all funds make investments in all assets. The notion of preferentially attaching
to a subset of assets therefore has no meaning when funds are simply forced to invest in every asset. This
leads us to hypothesise that the non-uniformity of the size of allocations funds make to each asset must
have an effect on stability. This would be a potentially important result because a common assumption in
the literature is that funds make equal investments in each of the assets in their portfolio, e.g. (Acemoglu
et al., 2015; Caccioli et al., 2014).
In order to test this hypothesis, we introduce a parameter α that we use to interpolate between funds
holding uniformly-allocated portfolios (α → 1) or Gaussian-allocated portfolios (α → 0). All previous
results in the present paper set α = 0. Figure 9 presents the probability of contagion in the high leverage
scenario, at maximum diversification (ρ = 1 such that all funds invest in all assets), as we vary crowding
parameter β ∈ {−7.5, 0, 7.5} and interpolate α ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. For each (α, β) parameter pair we
performed 100 Monte-Carlo trials, and report the mean and 95% confidence interval from the resulting
distribution of default cascade occurrence. As hypothesised, we see that the probability of contagion for
different levels of crowding converges as we interpolate from Gaussian to uniform portfolios. This confirms
that the surprisingly beneficial impact of increased portfolio crowding in high-leverage scenarios is indeed a
result of the non-uniformity of asset allocations in our model.
Although we have established a connection between portfolio allocation uniformity and systemic risk,
we now consider the reason that this connection exists. We hypothesise that the reduced probability of
contagion for non-uniform asset allocations in high-crowding compared to low-crowding scenarios is due to
the presence of weakly-connected assets in the fund–asset network.
As described in Section 3.2.3, when funds allocate their investments to assets during network construction,
they do so in decreasing investment size order. Since the preferential attachment process selects investment
targets without replacement, this means that in crowded scenarios (β > 0) funds will tend to allocate their
largest investment to the same asset as have other funds. This leads to dispersion in the overall amount
invested in each asset. As a consequence, some assets receive significantly higher levels of total investment
than others. We might expect that assets with lower levels of total investment are, ceteris paribus, less
systemically important than assets with higher levels of investment. This conjecture must hold in the limit∑nf
j=1Aij → 0 for some asset i ∈ [1, na] since by definition such an asset is disconnected from the network.
The inset graph of Figure 9 presents the number of Monte Carlo trials exhibiting a default cascade
as a function of the total level of investment in the asset that receives the price shock, for the highly-
crowded β = 7.5 case, for all values of α. We rank assets according to their total level of investment and
report the normalised rank (percentile) of the asset that receives the initial shock. The figure clearly shows
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Figure 9: [DOUBLE COLUMN] [IN COLOUR] Probability of contagion with 95% confidence interval as we interpolate
between Gaussian-distributed and uniformly-distributed asset allocations for each fund. α → 1 implies funds allocate their
capital equally to each asset in which they invest. We fix ρ = 1 here, such that each fund invests in every asset. This study
was carried out in the high-leverage scenario, θ∗1 . Inset: The number of Monte Carlo trials exhibiting a default cascade as a
function of the total level of investment in the asset that receives the price shock, for the highly-crowded β = 7.5 case.
that when no default cascade occurs (dark shaded bars), the shocked asset did indeed have a low level
of total investment compared to other assets. This strongly supports our hypothesis that the surprising
benefit of portfolio crowding on systemic stability in high leverage, high diversification scenarios is due
to the presence of weakly-connected assets. This, in turn, establishes the importance of considering non-
uniform asset allocations in future studies of such phenomena. Figure 9 (inset) also demonstrates that the
converse does not hold — default cascades frequently occur even when the shocked asset is weakly-connected.
This indicates that the emergent system dynamics are not simply reducible to a statement about the level
of investment in a given asset. This finding also has important regulatory consequences. We find that
regulators cannot simply ignore the effect of weakly-connected assets when considering systemic stability,
as shocks to such assets can readily trigger catastrophic systemic failure.
8. Conclusion
Our results contribute to the rapidly growing literature on systemic risk. We provide a significant early
bridge between the macroscopic domain of networks of shared asset holdings and the microscopic domain
of algorithmic trading and flash crashes. This study has shown that the detailed (microscopic) behaviour
of automated trading strategies has deep implications for (macroscopic) systemic risk. Our results will be
of interest to systemic risk researchers in academia, as well as to regulators who desire enhanced tools to
assess the stability of global financial systems.
The present study has been one of the first attempts to augment models of shared asset financial contagion
with limit order book driven price impact. Our results lend support to key conclusions from previous
macroscopic models, including the destabilising effects of leverage, capital and portfolio crowding. Our model
also reproduces expected robust-yet-fragile behaviour where systemic collapse is unlikely, but extensive when
it occurs.
Our key findings are:
1. Leverage management practice by investment funds engenders a contagion channel for flash crashes to
propagate between algorithmically traded assets.
2. The speed of flash crash propagation strongly depends on the amount of leverage and capital deployed
by funds and on network topology, but the dependence is not monotonic in high-crowding scenarios.
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3. Crowding can, under some circumstances, be beneficial to systemic stability.
The calibration of the model to realistic behavioural timescales allowed us to move beyond previous
macroscopic studies, and to measure the speed at which distress propagates through the financial network
during the trading day. We used this approach to characterise the time window available for regulatory
interventions, with results suggesting ex ante precautions may have higher efficacy than ex post reactions.
We found that financial network structure and leverage management policies each have critical impact
on both systemic stability and distress propagation speed. Surprisingly, we found that in high-leverage
scenarios, under certain conditions, increased portfolio crowding enhances systemic stability. We connected
this result to the presence of weakly-connected asset nodes in the financial network. Such circumstances do
not occur in previous models that conventionally assume uniform portfolio allocations.
Finally, our results provide new insights into the role played by algorithmic trading strategies in the
propagation of systemic risk. We find that leverage management policies by funds with overlapping portfolios
provide a sufficient contagion channel for the propagation of flash crashes between algorithmically-traded
assets. This contagion channel has received little attention in the flash crash simulation literature. Our
findings highlight the need for future systemic risk models to move beyond long-established non-crisis price
impact assumptions. The path-dependent nature of liquidity provision and flash crashes in asset markets
strongly suggests that agent-based methodology is more appropriate than closed-form analysis for future
studies.
Future Work
Bringing real-world data into the macroscopic model component constitutes an important future work
direction, particularly in order for recommendations to be useful to regulators and policy-makers. The fund-
asset network is in principle available from public 13-f filings (in the USA) though the size of this dataset
would demand careful handling in order to keep simulations tractable10. Bank-fund margin arrangements
are highly proprietary and so it may be necessary to utilise the work of others such as Ang et al. (2011) who
have accessed such datasets.
Further extensions involve the relaxation of the assumptions of the model. It would be straightforward to
model non-uniform asset liquidity and non-uniform leverage and capital across funds. It would be interesting
to see what impact the introduction of such heterogeneity would have on systemic risk. A particular priority
would be to allow funds to enter both long and short positions. This would then enable us to explore events
such as the 2007 Quant Meltdown (Khandani and Lo, 2007; Cont and Wagalath, 2013) where it was risk
factors, rather than simply asset holdings, that became crowded. As Capponi and Larsson (2015) find that
the strategic selection of which assets to sell during distressed deleveraging has a critical impact on systemic
risk, we could extend our work to explore whether Capponi and Larsson (2015)’s findings hold when price
impact is modelled realistically.
Exploring strategic decision making by banks in terms of their margin call issuance could be an interesting
future direction, leading naturally into a multi-bank model in which banks seek to protect their interests.
This could include not issuing margin calls in order to avoid fire sales in assets the bank itself holds. Banks
are also an obvious regulatory target for new policy and interventions.
Finally, liquidity provision by trading agents and, in-particular, market makers plays a critical role
during flash crashes by directly affecting the price impact of distressed sell orders. Our model could be readily
extended to explore the systemic impact of strategic decision making by those agents. In particular, it would
be interesting to compare the leverage-induced contagion channel of the present paper with other channels
explored in the literature such as arbitrage of exchange traded funds (ETFs) against futures contracts.
These contagion channels were each proposed as important by both the CFTC and SEC (2010) in response
to the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010 and Jackson et al. (2017) in response to the Sterling Flash Event of
7th October 2016. Our model provides a solid foundation for further investigation into the role played by
algorithmic trading in causing systemic risk.
10Although the simulation has been optimized for a state-of-the-art HPC cluster, scaling up from tens to tens of thousands
of assets represents a significant challenge.
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Appendix A. Trader Agent Details
The behavioural details of the trader agent classes are as follows:
Small Traders. Small traders place minimally-sized limit orders according to a uniform distribution around
prevailing bid and ask prices on the LOB and thus are truly zero-intelligence (Gode and Sunder, 1993).
These orders may be aggressive and remove liquidity from the book or passive and add liquidity which may
match against subsequent aggressive orders of opposing sign. Small traders have no dependence on price
or volume changes, and we do not model inventory limits for this agent type. Their slow interaction speed
means that any individual small trader is highly unlikely to build a significant position during a simulation
run. We deviate from Paddrik et al. (2012)’s implementation by increasing the spread within which orders
can be placed from 10 ticks to 1000 ticks. This change allows our model to better capture the relative
price stylised fact, as discussed in Section 4, and is our method of modelling stub quote order placement.
Stub quotes are orders placed far from prevailing prices that are not intended for execution, but that were
identified as playing a role in the Flash Crash of 6th May 2010 (CFTC and SEC, 2010).
Fundamental buyers / sellers. Fundamental buyers / sellers are in possession of a private valuation for the
asset and will execute when prevailing prices yield a trading surplus (Wellman, 2011). Fundamental buyers
/ sellers seek to balance trading impact with immediacy (Paddrik et al., 2012) and so are represented as
gradually building positions throughout the simulation run. Inventory limits are not modelled for such
agents, however the agents do possess slightly above zero intelligence (known as -intelligence). As in
Paddrik et al. (2012), fundamental buyers / sellers are sensitive to toxic order flow (Easley et al., 2012). If
prices trend either higher or lower by more than 70 ticks over a one-minute horizon, fundamental buyers /
sellers will avoid placing any orders until the market stabilises. This behaviour was identified during the
real 6th May 2010 Flash Crash by Kirilenko et al. (2017). Fundamental buyers / sellers have an extremely
important function in flash crash generation — without the action of fundamental buyers reacting to far
from fundamental prices, prices would not rebound following the initial crash.
Opportunistic Herding. These agents represent a class of traders that react to external information such as
corporate news dissemination. The order placement direction probability of opportunists follows a stochastic
process. These agents operate over an intermediate timescale and are modelled with small inventory limits.
It is not entirely clear from Paddrik et al. (2012) or later related works (Hayes et al., 2014; Paddrik et al.,
2015; Bookstaber and Paddrik, 2015) what the impact of opportunists is on the model dynamics, but since
Kirilenko et al. (2017) identify this group of real-world market participants we include them for completeness.
Market Makers. Market makers are algorithmic traders that maintain simultaneous limit orders on both
sides of the LOB and exclusively provide (rather than remove) liquidity. As such, they have been identified as
systemically important for the efficient operation of asset markets (Wah and Wellman, 2015; Bookstaber and
Paddrik, 2015). Paddrik et al. (2012) model market makers with small inventory capacity and, furthermore,
model the documented tendency for market makers to retreat from trading by widening spreads or indeed
suspending order placement entirely when they detect toxic order flow (Easley et al., 2012). Similarly to
fundamental buyers / sellers, when the one-minute price trend exceeds 24 ticks market makers cease trading
(calibration based on Kirilenko et al. (2017)). When the market maker inventory is saturated, the agents
attempt to liquidate positions passively. They do this by providing liquidity only on the offsetting side of
the LOB. We model market makers exiting the liquidation state once their absolute inventory reaches half
of its maximum limit.
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High Frequency Traders. High frequency traders (HFTs) in the model act as very fast market makers first
and foremost, though they also possess a simple shared trading signal (Paddrik et al., 2012) which skews
their order placement side probability in the direction of LOB imbalances. An imbalance in this context
refers to a difference in the quantity of available shares resting on either side of the LOB. The probability
that an HFT will place a buy order in the jth asset is given by P (buy)j = Q
bid
j /(Qbidj +Q
ask
j ), where Q
bid
j (Q
ask
j )
refers to the total quantity of shares available at the best bid (ask) price (Paddrik et al., 2012). This signal
can be considered a crude prediction algorithm. The intuition behind it is that, when Qbidj  Qaskj it is
likely that the price will rise in the near future, and so it is rational for the HFT agent to buy, in order to
profit from the expected price move. The public nature of the signal results in a well-documented herding
effect (Menkveld, 2016). When their small inventory11 is saturated, HFTs aggressively reduce positions by
taking liquidity. This effect has been implicated in deepening the 6th May 2010 Flash Crash as HFTs passed
positions back and forth between themselves in a “hot potato” fashion (Abrol et al., 2016; Aldrich et al.,
2016).
Appendix B. Bipartite Network Generation
Algorithm 1 presents our method for constructing random bipartite networks with controllable diversi-
fication and crowding.
Algorithm 1 Random Bipartite Networks with Preferential Attachment
Require: nf , na, ρ, β, C
0, λ0, σ
1: Aij ← 0,∀i ∈ {1, ..., nf},∀j ∈ {1, ..., na}
2: for all i ∈ {1, ..., nf} do
3: # Calculate total value already invested in each asset
4: for all j ∈ {1, ..., na} do
5: totalj ←
∑nf
i Aij
6: end for
7: # Calculate preferential probability of selecting each asset
8: for all j ∈ {1, ..., na} do
9: rj ← rank(j, total)
10: if β < 0 then
11: rj ← na − rj + 1
12: end if
13: pj ← rβj /
∑na
j r
β
j
14: end for
15: # Calculate fund fractional investment to assets
16: kfund ← max(N (ρ, σ)× na, 1)
17: for all k ∈ {1, ..., kfund} do
18: j′ ← weightedChoice(na, p, false)
19: Aij′ ← nextInvestmentSize(i)
20: end for
21: # Convert normalised fractional investments to currency values
22: Aij ← C0(1 + λ0)Aij/
∑na
j Aij
23: end for
24: return A
Algorithm 1 makes the following function calls:
11The findings of CFTC and SEC (2010) suggests a total inventory across all HFTs of 3000 contracts. Paddrik et al. (2012)
utilise 3000 contracts per HFT, which remains uncorrected in later papers (Hayes et al., 2014; Paddrik et al., 2015).
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rank(j,L). returns the index that the jth element of list L would receive, if the elements of L were sorted
in ascending numerical order.
weightedChoice(na,weights, replacement). returns j
′ ∈ [1, na] with probability given by the j′th ele-
ment of the vector weights, with or without replacement.
nextInvestmentSize(i). returns values in units of currency representing the sizes of investment fund i
makes in each of the kfund assets in its portfolio. Investments are returned in decreasing size order based on
repeated samples from a Gaussian distribution N (0, 1) constrained such that the fractional investments to
the kfund assets sum to unity.
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